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Earnings persistenceThe Taiwanese government oﬀers ﬁrms that invest in qualiﬁed projects in
emerging high-tech industries two mutually exclusive tax incentives—a corpo-
rate 5-year tax exemption or shareholder investment tax credits. This study
examines whether corporate managers take shareholder tax beneﬁts into
account in their corporate tax planning. The results show that privately held
ﬁrms are more likely than listed ﬁrms to choose shareholder investment tax
credits and forego corporate tax beneﬁts. Listed ﬁrms with relatively high earn-
ings response coeﬃcients tend to choose a corporate 5-year tax exemption, as it
can enhance reported after-tax earnings. Further, in the 5-year period follow-
ing their choice of a particular tax incentive, ﬁrms choosing a corporate 5-year
tax exemption exhibit signiﬁcantly lower earnings persistence than those
choosing shareholder investment tax credits. Taken together, these results sug-
gest that stock market pressure has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on ﬁrms’ choices
between corporate and shareholder tax beneﬁts, and that the choice of tax
incentives has an eﬀect on future earnings quality.
 2015 Sun Yat-sen University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This
is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creative-
commons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
To promote technological advancement, the Taiwanese government provides two mutually exclusive tax
incentives to stimulate investment in qualiﬁed high-tech industries.1 Companies that invest in the qualiﬁed
industries can select either a 5-year exemption from corporate income tax on income derived from those
investments or they can pass the tax incentive to their shareholders by granting shareholders investment
tax credits of up to 20% (for corporate shareholders) or 10% (for individual shareholders) of the qualiﬁedand are
76 M.-C. Chen / China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 75–89investment amount.2 As only one of the two alternatives can be selected, the choice of tax incentive is an
important tax planning decision as to whether ﬁrms should keep the tax beneﬁt at the corporate level or pass
it to their shareholders. In Taiwan, the overall tax revenue losses resulting from these two tax incentives during
the 1999–2005 period amounted to about US$3.6 billion.3 The magnitude of the tax-savings from the two tax
incentives is so signiﬁcant that the choice between the two alternatives is generally regarded as one of the most
important tax planning decisions made by managers in Taiwan.
The choice between shareholder tax beneﬁts and corporate tax exemptions oﬀered to managers of
Taiwanese ﬁrms provides researchers with an opportunity to examine whether ﬁrms take shareholder taxes
into account when making corporate tax planning decisions. Prior studies have addressed the role of capital
market incentives in ﬁrms’ tax planning concerns (Cloyd et al., 1996; Klassen, 1997; Armstrong et al., 2012;
Graham et al., 2014). These studies, however, focus on the trade-oﬀ between corporate tax beneﬁts and ﬁnan-
cial reporting costs. They have not addressed if and how capital market incentives aﬀect a ﬁrm’s choice
between corporate and shareholder tax beneﬁts. This study empirically investigates whether ﬁrms consider
shareholder tax beneﬁts when making corporate tax planning decisions in the presence of capital market
pressure.
Scholes et al. (2015) emphasize in their classic textbook Taxes and Business Strategy: A Planning Approach
that eﬀective tax planning should take “all parties” into consideration. The Taiwanese context, in which ﬁrms
choose either a corporate 5-year tax exemption or shareholder investment tax credits, constitutes a rare oppor-
tunity to empirically investigate how ﬁrms make the trade-oﬀ between corporate and shareholder tax beneﬁts
in tax planning.
Maximizing the overall tax beneﬁts for a ﬁrm and its stockholders is contingent upon accurate forecasts of
the ﬁrm’s proﬁtability in the 5-year period following the qualiﬁed investment. Ex-ante, if the projected tax-sav-
ings from a corporate 5-year tax exemption exceed those of shareholder investment tax credits, ﬁrms should
choose a corporate 5-year tax exemption. Conversely, if the aggregate amount of shareholder investment tax
credits exceeds the tax-savings of a corporate 5-year tax exemption, then the ﬁrm should choose shareholder
investment tax credits and thereby shift the tax beneﬁts directly to its stockholders.
Consider, as an example, an investment of $100 million in a qualiﬁed project. If the ﬁrm chooses
shareholder investment tax credits, its shareholders may directly obtain tax credits of up to $20 million (for
corporate shareholders) or $10 million (for individual shareholders). Conversely, if the ﬁrm chooses a corpo-
rate 5-year tax exemption, assuming that the rate of return on the project is a constant 20% per annum and the
corresponding corporate tax rate is 25%,4 the ﬁrm’s overall tax savings during the 5-year period will be (undis-
counted) $25 million in total. In the latter case, the shareholders pay the associated incremental individual
income taxes, while the company distributes the tax-exempt earnings in the form of dividends. Thus, the opti-
mal decision is based on the trade-oﬀ between corporate and shareholder tax savings.
In addition to creating tax savings for either ﬁrms or shareholders, the choice between the two tax incen-
tives may also aﬀect ﬁrms’ reported earnings. Firms that choose a corporate 5-year tax exemption can directly
reduce their corporate income tax expenses, whereas ﬁrms that pass investment tax credits to their sharehold-
ers still have to pay corporate income tax. Thus, ceteris paribus, ﬁrms choosing a corporate 5-year tax exemp-
tion will report greater after-tax earnings in their ﬁnancial statements than ﬁrms choosing shareholder
investment tax credits. Consequently, when choosing a tax incentive, ﬁrms are also making a trade-oﬀ between
corporate ﬁnancial reporting costs and shareholder tax beneﬁts.
This study conducts empirical tests in the following two ways. First, I compare the tax planning decisions of
privately held and listed ﬁrms.5 Compared with listed ﬁrms, privately held ﬁrms, which do not have stock price
pressure from the capital market, are more likely to choose shareholder investment tax credits, thereby giving2 The credit rate depends on the type of shareholder. The credit rate is 20% for corporate shareholders and 10% for individual
shareholders. Firms that choose a corporate 5-year tax exemption must relinquish the application for shareholder investment tax credits,
and vice versa, with no alteration being allowed after the choice is made.
3 Financial Data Center, Ministry of Finance (Taiwan), Statistics on Tax Revenues of Proﬁt-Seeking Enterprise Income Tax (1999–
2005).
4 Taiwan’s corporate income tax rate is essentially a ﬂat rate of 25% for taxable income above NT$100,000.
5 Privately held ﬁrms’ stocks are not listed on either of the two stock exchanges. Hence, privately held ﬁrms are not subject to stock price
pressure from the capital market.
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two types of ﬁrms aﬀects their choice between a corporate 5-year tax exemption and shareholder investment
tax credits.
Second, I examine how tax planning decisions within listed ﬁrms vary with diﬀerent levels of capital market
pressure. As listed ﬁrms may diﬀer in their level of stock price pressure, the incentive for them to increase
reported earnings may also vary with the pressure from the capital market. For instance, listed ﬁrms with
relatively high earnings response coeﬃcients (ERCs), whose stock returns exhibit a high degree of covariation
with reported earnings, are more likely than ﬁrms with low ERCs to have strong incentives to increase
reported earnings to reduce their ﬁnancial reporting costs. Accordingly, ﬁrms with high ERCs are more
likely to choose a corporate 5-year tax exemption than ﬁrms with low ERCs. Hence, I use ERCs as a direct
proxy for the degree of stock price pressure on listed ﬁrms and examine whether diﬀerences in listed ﬁrms’
stock price pressure aﬀect their choice of a corporate 5-year tax exemption or shareholder investment tax
credits.6
To analyze the economic consequences of the choice of tax incentive, I further examine whether ﬁnancial
reporting incentives are diﬀerent in ﬁrms that choose diﬀerent types of tax incentives. For ﬁrms that choose
shareholder investment credits, the total tax beneﬁts of shareholders are determined by the qualiﬁed invest-
ment amount and are thus independent of ﬁrms’ future earnings. In contrast, for ﬁrms choosing a corporate
5-year exemption, the total corporate tax beneﬁts depend on the ﬁrms’ future earnings during the 5-year
exemption period. Thus, compared with ﬁrms that choose shareholders tax beneﬁts, ﬁrms that choose a cor-
porate 5-year exemption are likely to have a greater incentive to maximize their earnings during the exemption
period, resulting in lower levels of earnings persistence.
The results of this study show that privately held ﬁrms are more likely than listed ﬁrms to choose share-
holder investment tax credits. Additionally, listed ﬁrms with relatively high ERCs tend to choose a corporate
5-year tax exemption that increases their reported after-tax earnings. Further, in the 5-year period following
their choice of a tax incentive, ﬁrms choosing a corporate 5-year tax exemption exhibit signiﬁcantly lower
earnings persistence than those choosing shareholder investment tax credits. Together, these results suggest
that stock price pressure has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on ﬁrms’ choices of corporate or shareholder tax beneﬁts,
and that the type of tax incentive aﬀects future earnings quality, as proxied by earnings persistence. The results
of this study extend the ﬁndings of previous studies (Cloyd et al., 1996; Klassen, 1997; Armstrong et al., 2012;
Graham et al., 2014) by providing evidence that ﬁrms’ tax planning decisions involve a trade-oﬀ between
shareholder-level tax beneﬁts and corporate reported earnings.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses previous empirical research on
corporate tax planning. Section 3 develops the research hypotheses and describes the empirical procedures
and sample used to test the hypotheses. Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical ﬁndings, and
Section 5 concludes the paper with a discussion of the research results and their implications.2. Related research
Tax planning plays an important role in business operations, yet few empirical studies have investigated the
tax planning behavior of ﬁrms, as ﬁrms’ tax planning data are conﬁdential. Ke (2001) investigates the eﬀect of
the 1993 increase in the personal tax rate relative to the corporate tax rate on managerial compensation in
privately held insurance companies. He ﬁnds that after 1993, in response to the changes in the relative rate
schedules for individual and corporate income taxes, management-owned insurance companies pay their
shareholders/managers less tax-deductible compensation than a control sample of non-management-owned
counterparts. This result implies that when designing optimal shareholder/manager compensation, ﬁrms
attempt to minimize the overall tax costs of both ﬁrms and shareholders.
The tax rate reduction of the 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA 86) provides an experimental setting for examin-
ing ﬁrms’ motivations to shift income from corporations to shareholders. As the TRA 86 reduces the top6 Unlike the US, Taiwan does not have sophisticated analyst-following data. Only a few well-known companies are followed by foreign
analysts. Most Taiwanese companies do not have available data on analyst following or earnings forecasts. Therefore, I use ERCs as a
proxy for stock price pressure.
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S corporations are subject to double taxation, have the incentive to shift income from corporations to share-
holders, and, as a result, yield a lower pretax rate of returns. Using a sample of 6839 privately held C and S
corporations from the motor carrier industry from the 1984–1992 period, Enis and Ke (2003) examine the
eﬀect of the TRA 86 on income shifting from corporations to shareholders. They estimate that during the sam-
ple period C corporations shifted an average of $130,587 of taxable income each year to shareholders after the
TRA 86 was enacted.
Ke (2001) and Enis and Ke (2003) show that contingent upon the relative corporate and individual tax
rates, managers do engage in strategic shifting of corporate taxable income to shareholders to minimize the
overall tax burden for both ﬁrms and shareholders. This is consistent with the conclusion of Scholes et al.
(2015) that an eﬀective tax planning framework considers all stakeholders. By analyzing changes in reported
earnings and other ﬁnancial variables corresponding to changes in tax policies (e.g., TRA 86), these studies
provide indirect evidence that ﬁrms seek to minimize the overall tax burden of their stakeholders in their
strategic tax planning. In summary, previous studies support a broader hypothesis that rational ﬁrms will
attempt to maximize the overall tax and nontax beneﬁts of their stakeholders by making eﬀective tax planning
decisions. In contrast, this study directly observes ﬁrms’ selection of speciﬁc alternative incentives that oﬀer
tax savings to either the ﬁrm or to its shareholders. Thus it provides a natural experiment to directly examine
the factors associated with ﬁrms’ speciﬁc tax planning decisions.
An alternative hypothesis to ﬁrms seeking to minimize the overall tax burden of stakeholders is that they
balance this aim with the need to minimize ﬁnancial reporting costs. Financial reporting costs (or capital mar-
ket pressure, Klassen (1997)) are non-tax costs, such as debt covenant violation, reduced executive com-
pensation and the perceived negative stock market consequences associated with reductions in reported
earnings (Cloyd et al., 1996; Klassen, 1997; Armstrong et al., 2012; Graham et al., 2014). In a survey of ﬁnan-
cial executives of large and medium-sized public and private manufacturing ﬁrms, Cloyd et al. (1996) show
that public ﬁrms with higher ﬁnancial reporting costs are less inclined than private ﬁrms with lower ﬁnancial
reporting costs to choose ﬁnancial accounting methods that conform to an aggressive tax position.
Consequently, private ﬁrms are more likely to choose accounting methods that are less optimistic but are
likely to increase the probability of successfully defending their tax positions if challenged by the IRS.
These results suggest that in defending an aggressive tax position, managers face a trade-oﬀ between ﬁnancial
reporting costs and corporate tax beneﬁts.
Using the concentration of inside ownership as a proxy for capital market pressure,7 Klassen (1997) ﬁnds
that in the trade-oﬀ between ﬁnancial and tax reporting, ﬁrms with greater inside ownership concentration
tend to favor corporate tax beneﬁts, whereas those with lower inside ownership concentration tend to favor
ﬁnancial reporting costs.
Using proprietary data on the incentive compensation of tax directors of public companies, Armstrong
et al. (2012) ﬁnd a strong negative relationship between the incentive compensation of tax directors and the
GAAP eﬀective tax rate, but little relationship between the incentive compensation of tax directors and other
tax attributes. These results indicate that tax directors of public companies are provided with incentives to
reduce the level of tax expense reported in ﬁnancial statements.
Analyzing survey responses from nearly 600 corporate tax executives, Graham et al. (2014) ﬁnd that ﬁnan-
cial accounting incentives play an important role in tax planning—84% of surveyed publicly traded ﬁrms
responded that the top management at their company cares at least as much about the GAAP ETR as they
do about cash taxes paid. In addition, their regression results show that the primary driver for determining the
relative importance of ﬁnancial concerns is capital market incentives, as proxied by being publicly traded, hav-
ing a high analyst following or having high institutional ownership.
Prior research indicates that public companies have strong incentives for considering ﬁnancial reporting
concerns in tax planning decisions (Klassen, 1997; Armstrong et al., 2012; Graham et al., 2014). These studies,
however, do not examine the trade-oﬀ between corporate ﬁnancial reporting costs and shareholder tax7 Klassen argues that ﬁrms with greater concentration of inside ownership experience less pressure from the capital market, whereas the
opposite is true.
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all parties (Scholes et al., 2015). Thus, this study extends the literature by examining how ﬁrms make the
choice between corporate and shareholder tax beneﬁts. Further, instead of using survey data, this study uses
ﬁrms’ actual choices of tax incentives to analyze the determinants of the trade-oﬀ between corporate and
shareholder tax beneﬁts.
3. Research hypotheses and research methods
3.1. Research hypotheses
First, I consider the eﬀect of stock market pressure on the choice between a corporate 5-year tax exemption
and shareholder investment tax credits. For listed ﬁrms, the perceived stock market consequences of reported
earnings are directly associated with the selected tax treatment. To increase reported after-tax earnings, listed
ﬁrms are more likely to choose a corporate 5-year tax exemption. Conversely, privately held ﬁrms do not
experience stock price pressure from the capital market and are accordingly more likely than their listed coun-
terparts to choose shareholder investment tax credits and thereby directly pass tax beneﬁts to their share-
holders. Hence, the ﬁrst hypothesis for this study is as follows.
H1. Privately held ﬁrms are more likely than listed ﬁrms to choose shareholder investment tax credits.
Second, I consider the eﬀect of market pressure on the choice between a corporate 5-year tax exemption and
shareholder investment tax credits. The measure of particular interest is the perceived capital market conse-
quences of the reported net income associated with the selected tax treatment. I capture market pressure using
ﬁrms’ ERCs, which exhibit the levels of covariation between unexpected earnings and stock returns. Hence,
changes in earnings will have a greater eﬀect on listed ﬁrms with high ERCs than on those with low ERCs.
Consequently, when trading oﬀ between ﬁnancial reporting costs and shareholder tax beneﬁts, listed ﬁrms
with high ERCs are more likely to choose a corporate 5-year tax exemption, as it will increase the reported
after-tax earnings in ﬁnancial statements. Accordingly, the second hypothesis for this study is as follows.
H2. Listed ﬁrms with relatively high ERCs are more likely to choose a corporate 5-year tax exemption than
listed ﬁrms with relatively low ERCs.3.2. Regression model
3.2.1. Eﬀect of stock price pressure on listed and privately held ﬁrms’ choices of tax incentives
The sample for the examination of the eﬀect of stock market pressure on the trade-oﬀ between corporate
reported earnings and shareholder tax beneﬁts includes both listed and privately held ﬁrms. As the dependent
variable is the choice of one of the two tax incentives, I use a dummy variable (TaxChoice) to represent the
choice decision and use a logistic regression estimation to analyze the tax planning decision. TaxChoice is set
to one if the ﬁrm chooses shareholder investment tax credits and set to zero if it chooses a corporate 5-year tax
exemption. The logistic regression model is as follows.TaxChoiceit ¼ k0 þ k1LISTEDi þ k2ROEit þ k3DEBT it þ k4SIZEit þ k5DYEARt þ eit ð1Þ
where the subscript i represents the individual ﬁrm and t is the sample year. The deﬁnitions of the independent
variables are as follows (expected signs on regression coeﬃcients are in brackets).LISTED (–) A dummy variable for ﬁrms with stocks listed on the stock market. LISTED is set to 1 if the
ﬁrm is a listed ﬁrm, and set to 0 if it is a privately held companyROE (–) Return on common stockholders’ equity, measured by (net income – preferred stock
dividends)  common stockholders’ equityDEBT (–) Debt ratio, measured as long-term liabilities  total assets
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DYEAR (+) A dummy variable for the sample period after the implementation of the Imputation System in
Taiwan. Taiwan implemented the Imputation System in 1998; hence, DYEAR is set to 1 if the
sample year is 1998 or later, and 0 otherwiseIn Model (1), stock market pressure is represented by the coeﬃcient on LISTED, an indicator variable for
listed ﬁrms. According to the ﬁrst hypothesis, in the presence of stock price pressure from the capital market,
listed ﬁrms are more likely than privately held ﬁrms to choose a corporate 5-year tax exemption to increase
reported after-tax earnings in ﬁnancial statements. Hence, the coeﬃcient on LISTED is expected to be
negative.
ROE and DEBT are included in the regression model to control for the eﬀect of ﬁrms’ proﬁtability and
ﬁnancial obligations on their choice of tax incentive. ROE is return on common stockholders’ equity.
Shareholders are more willing to preserve cash ﬂows within ﬁrms if the ﬁrms have higher ROEs. Thus, ﬁrms
with higher ROEs are more likely to choose a corporate 5-year tax exemption to reduce income tax payable at
the corporate level and enable them to preserve more after-tax cash ﬂows. DEBT is measured by long-term
debt divided by total assets. To avoid violating debt covenants, ﬁrms with higher debt ratios have a greater
need to preserve cash ﬂows to pay oﬀ interest and debt that is due (Begley, 1990; DeFond and Jiambalvo,
1994). Accordingly, they may be more inclined to choose a corporate 5-year tax exemption to reduce the
amount of cash needed to pay for corporate income tax.
SIZE is the natural log value of net sales and is used to control for the potential size eﬀect on the propensity
of ﬁrms to choose between the two tax incentives. SIZE is related to unobservable ﬁrm characteristics, such as
diversiﬁcation in ownership, growth opportunities, and economies of scales that may produce diﬀerent pro-
pensities in tax planning (Mills et al., 1998). There is no predicted sign on the coeﬃcient of SIZE.
DYEAR is a dummy variable for the period after the implementation of the Imputation System in Taiwan.
Taiwan implemented the Imputation System in 1998. The Imputation System grants income tax that is paid at
the corporate level as imputation tax credits (ITCs) to individual shareholders and allows individual share-
holders to oﬀset their income taxes with ITCs. If the individual income tax payable by a shareholder is less
than the received ITCs, the shareholder can claim tax refunds for the excess of the received ITCs over his
or her income tax payable. Hence, from a shareholder’s perspective, income tax paid at the corporate level
can oﬀset income tax payable when ﬁling individual tax returns and thus will not cause an increase in overall
tax costs under the Imputation System. Accordingly, I expect that in the period after the implementation of
the Imputation System, ﬁrms have fewer incentives to reduce income tax at the corporate level and more
incentives to directly reduce taxes at the shareholder level.
3.2.2. Eﬀect of stock price pressure on listed ﬁrms’ choices of tax incentives
The second research hypothesis concerns the eﬀect of diﬀerences in ERCs on listed ﬁrms’ choices of tax
incentives. To capture the market pressure caused by the relative values of ﬁrms’ ERCs, H_ERC replaces
LISTED in the regression model. H_ERC is an indicator variable for listed ﬁrms with relatively high
ERCs. H_ERC is set to 1 if the ﬁrm’s ERC is greater than the median ERC of all of the listed ﬁrms, and 0
otherwise. The regression model is as follows:TaxChoiceit ¼ a0 þ a1HERCit þ a2ROEit þ a3DEBT it þ a4SIZEit þ a5DYEARit þ eit ð2Þ
The deﬁnitions and measures of DYEAR, ROE, SIZE and DEBT in Model (2) are the same as in Model
(1).
Following Collins and Kothari (1989) and Ali and Zarowin (1992), the estimation of ERCs proceeds as
follows:Reti;QT ¼ ai þ biDX i;QT=P i;QðT1Þ þ ciRetMktQ;T þ diRetRF Q;T þ ei;QT ð3Þ
where the subscript i represents the individual ﬁrm and T is the estimation period that spans the 20 quarters
preceding the year in which the sample ﬁrm chooses a tax incentive. Q represents the four quarters of a year by
setting Q = 1 to 4. Model (3) is estimated separately for each sample ﬁrm. The individual ﬁrm’s ERC is
Table 1
Sample selection procedures.
Panel A: Listed and privately held ﬁrms for regression Model (1)
Total number of listed and privately held ﬁrms that were approved for tax incentives
for newly emerging and important industries in the 1996–2001 period
747
Less: Number of cases in which the tax incentive qualiﬁcation was repealed for not
completing the investment project within four years
(127)
Number of cases in which projects were not funded by shareholder cash investmentsa (41)
Listed ﬁrms that were missing ﬁnancial statement data on selected variables (76)
Number of listed and privately held ﬁrms for Model (1) 503
Panel B: Listed ﬁrms for regression Model (2)
Total number of listed ﬁrms that were approved for tax incentives of newly
emerging and important industries for the 1996–2001 period
466
Less: Number of cases in which the tax incentive qualiﬁcation was repealed for not
completing the investment project within four years
(54)
Number of cases in which projects were not funded by shareholder cash investmentsa (37)
Listed ﬁrms that were missing ﬁnancial statement data on selected variables (36)
Number of cases in which the ﬁrms were newly listed and did not have
suﬃcient stock return data for ERC estimation
(220)
Number of listed ﬁrms for Model (2) 119
a For investment projects that are not funded by shareholder cash investments, ﬁrms are not eligible to choose shareholder investment
tax credits and can only apply for a corporate 5-year tax exemption. Thus, they do not have to make a trade-oﬀ between the two tax
incentives.
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period covers 20 quarters.8 To obtain stable regression estimates, ﬁrms with data from less than 10 of the 20
quarters are excluded from the sample. The deﬁnitions and measures of the dependent and independent vari-
ables in Model (3) are as follows.Ret8 Quarterl
corporationIndividual ﬁrm i’s stock returns over the quarter QT
DX Unexpected earnings, DXQT = XQT – XQ(T1). To account for seasonal ﬂuctuations in quarterly
data, unexpected quarterly earnings are calculated by subtracting the current quarter’s earnings
from the same quarter earnings in the previous yearP Closing stock price at the end of the quarter QT
RetMkt Rate of return of the market portfolio over the quarter QT
RetRF Risk-free interest rate for quarter QT, measured by the deposit interest rate of the Bank of Taiwan
(the government-owned bank)3.3. Data and sample selection
Panels A and B of Table 1 outline the sample selection procedures for regression Models (1) and (2),
respectively. The sample consists of ﬁrms that applied to the Ministry of Finance (Taiwan) for approval
of qualiﬁed investments in emerging high-tech industries between 1996 and 2001. According to the Statue
of Upgrading Industries (Taiwan), to claim the tax incentives, approved investment projects have to be
completed within four years of the government’s approval. The choice between the two tax incentives is made
when the ﬁrms complete their planned investment projects. Hence, I collect data on each ﬁrm’s choice of tax
incentive when the ﬁrm ﬁnishes its investment plan. The annual ﬁnancial statement data used in the regression
models are from the year when the ﬁrm makes its tax incentive decision.y data are used to estimate ERCs because Taiwanese companies have a relatively short history compared with U.S.
s. Using yearly data results in a signiﬁcant reduction in sample size.
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The qualiﬁcation for tax incentives was repealed in 127 cases due to failure to complete the investment projects
within four years. The 41 ﬁrms with projects that were not funded by shareholder cash investments did not
qualify for shareholder investment tax credits and could only apply for the corporate 5-year tax exemption;
thus, they are excluded from the sample. Seventy-six ﬁrms are excluded for missing ﬁnancial statement data
on selected variables. Hence, the ﬁnal sample for Model (1) consists of 503 ﬁrms. Similar selection procedures
are applied to the sample for Model (2), as detailed in Panel B of Table 1. The ﬁnal sample for Model (2) con-
sists of 119 listed ﬁrms.4. Results
4.1. Eﬀect of capital market pressure on the choice of tax incentives—listed and privately held ﬁrms
4.1.1. Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis
Panels A, B, and C of Table 2 provide descriptive statistics of selected variables for the full sample, listed
companies and privately held companies, respectively. The mean value of TaxChoice for privately held com-
panies (0.555) is higher than that of listed companies (0.428), suggesting that privately held companies are
more likely to choose shareholder investment tax credits. The mean values of SIZE and ROE in listed com-
panies are greater than in the privately held companies, indicating that listed companies are usually larger in
size and more proﬁtable.
Table 3 shows the results of the correlation analysis of the dependent and independent variables. LISTED
is signiﬁcantly negatively related to TaxChoice, which is consistent with H1 in that listed ﬁrms are more likely
to choose tax incentives that enhance reported corporate earnings. In addition, ROE is signiﬁcantly negativelyTable 2
Descriptive statistics for selected variables—Model (1).
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Maximum Minimum
Panel A: All listed and privately held ﬁrms (N = 503)
TaxChoice 0.469 0.000 0.500 1.000 0.000
LISTED 0.674 1.000 0.469 1.000 0.000
ROE 0.043 0.074 0.206 0.677 0.758a
DEBT 0.112 0.083 0.114 0.636 0.000
SIZE 14.179 14.281 2.617 19.608 3.689a
DYEAR 0.907 1.000 0.291 1.000 0.000
Panel B: Listed ﬁrms (N = 339)
TaxChoice 0.428 0.000 0.495 1.000 0.000
ROE 0.093 0.101 0.194 0.677 0.758a
DEBT 0.111 0.086 0.108 0.435 0.000
SIZE 14.929 14.894 1.906 19.608 3.689a
DYEAR 0.879 1.000 0.327 1.000 0.000
Panel C: Privately held ﬁrms (N = 164)
TaxChoice 0.555 1.000 0.499 1.000 0.000
ROE 0.060 0.034 0.195 0.409 0.758a
DEBT 0.114 0.070 0.126 0.636 0.000
SIZE 12.631 12.884 3.095 17.503 3.689a
DYEAR 0.963 1.000 0.188 1.000 0.000
TaxChoice! The decision variable for the choice between a corporate 5-year tax exemption and shareholder investment tax credits.
TaxChoice is 1 if the ﬁrm chooses shareholder investment tax credits, and 0 if it chooses a corporate 5-year tax exemption.
LISTED! 1 if the ﬁrm is a listed company, and 0 if it is a privately held company.
ROE! Return on common stockholders’ equity, measured by (net income – preferred stock dividends)  common stockholders’ equity.
DEBT!Debt ratio, measured as long-term liabilities  total assets.
SIZE! Firm size, measured by the natural log value of net sales.
DYEAR! 1 if the year is in the post-Imputation System period, and 0 otherwise.
a Restrained to one-percentile value.
Table 3
Correlation analysis of selected variables—Model (1).
TaxChoice LISTED ROE DEBT SIZE DYEAR
TaxChoice 1
LISTED 0.1194 1
(0.0073)
ROE 0.1828 0.3627 1
(<.0001) (<.0001)
DEBT 0.1103 0.0110 0.2232 1
(0.0133) (0.8051) (<.0001)
SIZE 0.0208 0.4564 0.3689 0.1171 1
(0.6423) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0086)
DYEAR 0.0828 0.1359 0.1647 0.0170 0.0672 1
(0.0634) (0.0023) (0.0002) (0.7036) (0.1322)
(p-value in brackets).
TaxChoice! The decision variable for the choice between a corporate 5-year tax exemption and shareholder investment tax credits.
TaxChoice is 1 if the ﬁrm chooses shareholder investment tax credits, and 0 if it chooses a corporate 5-year tax exemption.
LISTED! 1 if the ﬁrm is a listed company, and 0 if it is a privately held company.
ROE! Return on common stockholders’ equity, measured by (net income – preferred stock dividends)  common stockholders’ equity.
DEBT!Debt ratio, measured as long-term liabilities  total assets.
SIZE! Firm size, measured by the natural log value of net sales.
DYEAR! 1 if the year is in the post-Imputation System period, and 0 otherwise.
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year tax exemption.
4.1.2. Logistic regression results
The left panel of Table 4 presents the logistic regression results for the full sample. The model’s log like-
lihood v2 is 24.34 and its p-value is 0.0002, suggesting that the regression model has overall good explanatory
power.
In the regression results for the full sample period, the coeﬃcient on LISTED is signiﬁcantly negative, with
a p-value equal to 0.074. This result is consistent with H1 in that listed ﬁrms in the presence of stock price
pressure tend to choose a corporate 5-year tax exemption to reduce ﬁnancial reporting costs, whereas privately
held ﬁrms that do not have stock price pressure from the capital market are more likely to choose shareholder
investment tax credits and thereby directly pass tax beneﬁts to their shareholders.
The coeﬃcient on ROE is signiﬁcantly negative with a p-value of 0.005. This is consistent with the predic-
tion that ﬁrms with higher return on equity are able to make more eﬃcient use of funds and thus tend to
choose a corporate 5-year tax exemption to retain more after-tax cash ﬂows within ﬁrms.
4.1.3. Additional analysis
Since Taiwan implemented the Imputation System in 1998, income tax paid at the corporate level is
imputed as tax credits at the individual shareholder level. Transformations in the tax system may result in
structural changes to ﬁrms’ tax planning propensity, as the motivation to minimize corporate income tax
may be less strong under new tax systems. Hence, I further modify the sample to examine whether diﬀerences
in stock price pressure faced by listed companies continue to aﬀect their choices of tax incentives under the
Imputation System.
The right panel of Table 4 reports the regression results for the 1998–2001 sample period. The results show
that the coeﬃcient on LISTED remains signiﬁcantly negative with a p-value of 0.081. The coeﬃcients and sig-
niﬁcance levels of the other variables are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from those for the full sample period. This
result suggests that under the Imputation System the eﬀect of capital market pressure remains pronounced for
listed ﬁrms when there is a trade-oﬀ between reported corporate earnings and shareholder tax beneﬁts.
Table 5
Descriptive statistics for selected variables—Model (2).
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Maximum Minimum
Panel A: All listed ﬁrms (N = 119)
TaxChoice 0.454 0.000 0.500 1.000 0.000
H_ERC 0.504 1.000 0.502 1.000 0.000
ROE 0.061 0.083 0.194 0.338 0.649a
DEBT 0.125 0.127 0.102 0.332 0.000
SIZE 15.923 15.911 1.506 19.608 13.318
DYEAR 0.908 1.000 0.291 1.000 0.000
Panel B: Listed ﬁrms that select shareholder investment tax credits (N = 54)
H_ERC 0.463 0.000 0.503 1.000 0.000
ROE 0.014 0.063 0.259 0.330 0.649a
DEBT 0.122 0.098 0.106 0.332 0.000
SIZE 15.690 15.502 1.612 19.608 13.318
DYEAR 0.981 1.000 0.136 1.000 0.000
Panel C: Listed ﬁrms that select a corporate 5-year exemption (N = 65)
H_ERC 0.538 1.000 0.502 1.000 0.000
ROE 0.099 0.109 0.101 0.338 0.255
DEBT 0.127 0.138 0.099 0.296 0.000
SIZE 16.116 16.293 1.394 19.493 13.391
DYEAR 0.846 1.000 0.364 1.000 0.000
TaxChoice! The decision variable for the choice between a corporate 5-year tax exemption and shareholder investment tax credits.
TaxChoice is 1 if the ﬁrm chooses shareholder investment tax credits, and 0 if it chooses a corporate 5-year tax exemption.
H_ERC! 1 if the ﬁrm’s ERC is greater than the median ERC of all of the ﬁrms, and 0 otherwise.
ROE! Return on common stockholders’ equity, measured by (net income – preferred stock dividends)  common stockholders’ equity.
DEBT!Debt ratio, measured as long-term liabilities  total assets.
SIZE! Firm size, measured by the natural log value of net sales.
DYEAR! 1 if the year is in the post-Imputation System period, and 0 otherwise.
a Restrained to one-percentile value.
Table 4
Logistic regression results for Model (1).
Variable Pred. sign Full sample period (1996–2001) Post-Imputation System sample period (1998–2001)
Coeﬃcient v2 p-value Coeﬃcient v2 p-value
Intercept ? 1.177 3.069 0.080 1.094 2.983 0.084
LISTED – 0.390 2.993 0.083 0.388 2.843 0.091
ROE – 1.670 8.760 0.003 1.627 7.991 0.004
DEBT – 1.192 1.967 0.161 1.028 1.363 0.242
SIZE ? 0.065 1.760 0.160 0.086 3.119 0.077
DYEAR + 0.366 1.224 0.268
Log likelihood v2 = 23.13 Log likelihood v2 = 17.66
p-value = 0.0003 p-value = 0.0014
N = 503 N = 456
TaxChoice! The decision variable for the choice between a corporate 5-year tax exemption and shareholder investment tax credits.
TaxChoice is 1 if the ﬁrm chooses shareholder investment tax credits, and 0 if it chooses a corporate 5-year tax exemption.
LISTED! 1 if the ﬁrm is a listed company, and 0 if it is a privately held company.
ROE! Return on common stockholders’ equity, measured by (net income – preferred stock dividends)  common stockholders’ equity.
DEBT!Debt ratio, measured as long-term liabilities  total assets.
SIZE! Firm size, measured by the natural log value of net sales.
DYEAR! 1 if the year is in the post-Imputation System period, and 0 otherwise.
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Table 6
Correlation analysis of selected variables—Model (2) (N = 119).
TaxChoice H_ERC ROE DEBT SIZE DYEAR
TaxChoice 1
H_ERC 0.0752 1
(0.4165)
ROE 0.2450 0.0831 1
(0.0073) (0.3691)
DEBT 0.0265 0.0504 0.1901 1
(0.7749) (0.5865) (0.0380)
SIZE 0.1412 0.1903 0.2405 0.0067 1
(0.1255) (0.0381) (0.0084) (0.9427)
DYEAR 0.2326 0.1478 0.1432 0.0122 0.0630 1
(0.0109) (0.1088) (0.1202) (0.8951) (0.4963)
(p-value in brackets).
TaxChoice! The decision variable for the choice between a corporate 5-year tax exemption and shareholder investment tax credits.
TaxChoice is 1 if the ﬁrm chooses shareholder investment tax credits, and 0 if it chooses a corporate 5-year tax exemption.
H_ERC! 1 if the ﬁrm’s ERC is greater than the median ERC of all of the ﬁrms, and 0 otherwise.
ROE! Return on common stockholders’ equity, measured by (net income – preferred stock dividends)  common stockholders’ equity.
DEBT!Debt ratio, measured as long-term liabilities  total assets.
SIZE! Firm size, measured by the natural log value of net sales.
DYEAR! 1 if the year is in the post-Imputation System period, and 0 otherwise.
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4.2.1. Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis
To enhance the validity of the research ﬁndings, the sample is further modiﬁed to examine whether diﬀer-
ences in ERCs produce diﬀerential eﬀects on listed ﬁrms’ choices of tax incentives. Panel A of Table 5 presents
the descriptive statistics of selected variables for the sample of listed ﬁrms. Panels B and C of Table 5 list the
descriptive statistics for listed ﬁrms that select shareholder investment tax credits and those that choose a cor-
porate 5-year tax exemption, respectively. Consistent with expectations, the meanH_ERC of ﬁrms that choose
a corporate 5-year exemption (0.538) is greater than that of ﬁrms that choose shareholder investment tax cred-
its (0.463). The mean ROE of ﬁrms that choose a corporate 5-year exemption (0.099) is also higher than that of
ﬁrms that choose shareholder investment tax credits (0.005). Table 6 presents the results of the correlation
analysis for the dependent and independent variables. Similar to the results for the full sample, ROE is signiﬁ-
cantly negatively related to TaxChoice, suggesting that listed ﬁrms with greater ROEs are more likely to
choose a corporate 5-year tax exemption.4.2.2. Logistic regression results
Table 7 presents the logistic regression results for listed companies. The model’s log likelihood v2 is 18.65
and its p-value is 0.0022. In addition, the correct ratio of predicted decisions based on a cutoﬀ probability of
0.5 is about 70.7%.
The left and right panels of Table 7 present the results for the full sample period and the 1998-2001 sample
period, respectively. The coeﬃcients on H_ERC in both panels are negative and signiﬁcant at 0.1, lending sup-
port to H2 in that listed companies with relatively higher ERCs, i.e. have a higher correlation between
reported earnings and stock prices, tend to choose a corporate 5-year tax exemption to increase their after-
tax earnings in ﬁnancial statements. Both of the stock market pressure variables, LISTED and H_ERC,
are signiﬁcantly negative in Tables 4 and 7. However, the coeﬃcients on DEBT are insigniﬁcant in Tables
4 and 7, suggesting that stock market pressure is a greater ﬁnancial reporting incentive than debt covenant
restrictions in ﬁrms choosing between the two types of tax beneﬁts.
The coeﬃcients on ROE in both of the regression results are negative and signiﬁcant, consistent with the
prediction that ﬁrms with higher return on equity tend to choose a corporate 5-year tax exemption to retain
more after-tax cash ﬂows within ﬁrms. Proﬁtable ﬁrms are able to make more eﬃcient use of funds and, as a
Table 7
Logistic regression results for Model (2).
Variable Pred. sign Full sample period (1996–2001) Post-Imputation System sample period (1998–2001)
Coeﬃcient v2 p-value Coeﬃcient v2 p-value
Intercept ? 1.508 0.397 0.529 4.228 3.272 0.071
H_ERC – 0.727 3.040 0.081 0.720 2.874 0.090
ROE – 2.974 4.135 0.042 3.241 4.528 0.033
DEBT – 1.884 0.835 0.361 1.538 0.527 0.468
SIZE ? 0.196 1.973 0.160 0.219 2.364 0.124
DYEAR + 2.381 4.722 0.030
Log likelihood v2 = 18.55 Log likelihood v2 = 12.05
p-value = 0.0023 p-value = 0.0170
N = 119 N = 108
TaxChoice! The decision variable for the choice between a corporate 5-year tax exemption and shareholder investment tax credits.
TaxChoice is 1 if the ﬁrm chooses shareholder investment tax credits, and 0 if it chooses a corporate 5-year tax exemption.
H_ERC! 1 if the ﬁrm’s ERC is greater than the median ERC of all of the ﬁrms, and 0 otherwise.
ROE! Return on common stockholders’ equity, measured by (net income – preferred stock dividends)  common stockholders’ equity.
DEBT!Debt ratio, measured as long-term liabilities  total assets.
SIZE! Firm size, measured by the natural log value of net sales.
DYEAR! 1 if the year is in the post-Imputation System period, and 0 otherwise.
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coeﬃcient on DYEAR in the full sample regression results is positive and signiﬁcant, suggesting that since the
implementation of the Imputation System, ﬁrms prefer shareholder investment tax credits that directly reduce
taxes payable at the shareholder level.
The ﬁnancial statement data used in Models (1) and (2) are from the year in which the ﬁrm makes its deci-
sion. I also conduct robustness tests using ﬁnancial statement data from the year before the ﬁrm makes its
decision. The untabulated results are qualitatively similar to those shown in Tables 4 and 7.4.2.3. Additional analysis
In choosing a tax incentive, a company is also deciding whether to transfer resources out of the ﬁrm to its
shareholders. A controlling shareholder may inﬂuence a company’s decision. Therefore, I further control for
the eﬀect of controlling shareholders’ stake by adding the percentage of shares held by the top ﬁve sharehold-
ers (TOP5) to Model (2). The untabulated regression results show that the coeﬃcient on TOP5 is positive but
insigniﬁcant, perhaps because tax beneﬁts passing directly to shareholders are proportional to the percentage
of shares they own if the company chooses shareholder investment credits, thereby reducing the potential con-
ﬂict of interest between controlling and minority shareholders. Nevertheless, after controlling for the percent-
age of shares held by controlling shareholders, the coeﬃcients on H_ERC remain negative and signiﬁcant at
0.1, consistent with H2. In addition, the coeﬃcients and signiﬁcance levels of the other variables are not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from those displayed in Table 7.4.3. Eﬀect of tax incentive choice on earnings persistence
In addition to the trade-oﬀ between tax beneﬁts and ﬁnancial reporting costs, the choice between a corpo-
rate ﬁve-year tax exemption and shareholder investment tax credits is likely to aﬀect a ﬁrm’s future earnings
planning. For ﬁrms choosing shareholder investment tax credits, the total credit amount of their shareholder
tax beneﬁt is determined by the amount of the qualiﬁed investment approved by the government. Therefore,
their shareholder tax beneﬁts are independent of the ﬁrms’ future earnings.
In contrast, for ﬁrms choosing a corporate ﬁve-year exemption, the total amount of their corporate tax
beneﬁt depends on the ﬁrms’ earnings during the ﬁve-year tax-exemption period. To maximize corporate
tax beneﬁts it is necessary to increase the ﬁrms’ earnings during the ﬁve-year tax-exemption period that follows
the approval of the tax incentive. As a consequence, ﬁrms engaging in maximizing their earnings during the
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sequences of diﬀerent tax incentives, I further test whether ﬁrms choosing a corporate ﬁve-year exemption are
likely to have lower earnings persistence than those choosing shareholder investment tax credits during the
ﬁve-year exemption period.
Following Hanlon (2005) and Blaylock et al. (2012), I construct the following two earnings persistence
equations as Models (4) and (5) to examine whether ﬁrms choosing a corporate ﬁve-year exemption tend
to have lower earnings persistence.9 Fir
observ
10 = t
11 = 1
12 ThPTBIi;tþ1 ¼ c0 þ c1PTBIi;t þ ei;tþ1 ð4Þ
PTBIi;tþ1 ¼ a0 þ a1PTBIi;t þ a2EXEMPT i þ a3EXEMPT i  PTBIi;t þ ei;tþ1 ð5Þwhere PTBI is pretax accounting income scaled by average total assets for cross-sectional comparability,
and the coeﬃcients c1 and a1 are estimates of the mapping of current-period pretax earnings into future
(one-period) earnings, referred to as the persistence parameter (Blaylock et al., 2012). EXEMPT is a dummy
variable set to 1 if the ﬁrm chooses a corporate 5-year tax exemption, and 0 if it chooses shareholder invest-
ment tax credits. EXEMPT  PTI is the interaction term of EXEMPT and PTI. EXEMPT  PTI captures
the eﬀect of a 5-year exemption on earnings persistence.
Model (4) is the baseline model that forms the basis of earnings persistence tests in Hanlon (2005) and
Blaylock et al. (2012). I add EXEMPT and EXEMPT  PTBI to Model (5) to test whether the choice of a
corporate ﬁve-year exemption has a negative eﬀect on ﬁrms’ earnings persistence. I expect a3, the coeﬃcient
on EXEMPT  PTBI, to be negative if the choice of a corporate 5-year exemption results in a lower persis-
tence of current-period pretax earnings into future earnings.
The left and right panels of Table 8 present the results of Models (4) and (5) respectively, using the ﬁve
years following the year the ﬁrm makes the choice of tax incentive as the sample period.9 The results show
that both c1 and a1 are positive and signiﬁcant. However, as expected, a3 is negative and signiﬁcant, suggesting
that ﬁrms choosing a corporate 5-year tax exemption have lower earnings persistence during the ﬁve years fol-
lowing the year they make their choice. Further, the coeﬃcient c1 represents the average earnings persistence
of the sample without controlling for the diﬀerence between the two types of tax incentives, and the coeﬃcient
a1 is the average earnings persistence after controlling for this diﬀerence. The coeﬃcient c1 (0.479) is noticeably
lower than the coeﬃcient a1 (0.635), suggesting that the average earnings persistence of the sample is signiﬁ-
cantly reduced by ﬁrms choosing a corporate 5-year tax exemption. The results of Model (4) show that the
average earnings persistence of ﬁrms choosing shareholder investment tax credits is about 0.635, whereas
the average earnings persistence for ﬁrms choosing a corporate 5-year exemption is about 0.385,10 nearly
40%11 lower.
To exclude the possibility that the lower earnings persistence of ﬁrms choosing a corporate 5-year tax
exemption is due to ﬁrm heterogeneity rather than ﬁrms strategically engaging in maximizing earnings behav-
ior, I further conduct regression analysis for Models (4) and (5) using the ﬁve years following the ﬁfth year
after the ﬁrm makes its choice of tax incentive as the sample period. If the signiﬁcant diﬀerence in earnings
persistence between ﬁrms choosing the two types of tax incentives shown in Table 8 is due to ﬁrm heterogene-
ity, the diﬀerence should remain pronounced after the 5-year exemption period.
The left and right panels of Table 9 present the results of Models (4) and (5) respectively, for the sample
period of the ﬁve years following the ﬁfth year after the ﬁrm makes its choice of tax incentive.12 The results
show that both c1 and a1 remain positive and signiﬁcant in Table 9. However, a3 becomes insigniﬁcant, as
shown in Table 9, suggesting that the diﬀerences between ﬁrms that choose the two types of tax incentives
disappear after the 5-year exemption period. In addition, the coeﬃcient c1 is 0.514 and the coeﬃcient a1 is
0.538 in Table 9. The diﬀerence in the two earnings persistence coeﬃcients does not appear to be noticeable
whether or not the type of tax incentive is controlled for. The results provide evidence that the choice of taxms without ﬁve years of consecutive annual data are deleted, reducing the number of ﬁrms to 240 and the sample to 1200 ﬁrm-year
ations (240 ﬁrms  5 years).
he coeﬃcient a1 (0.635) – the coeﬃcient a3 (0.250).
– 0.385/0.645.
e sample consists of 1135 ﬁrm-year observations.
Table 8
Regression results for Models (4) and (5). (Sample period: year t + 1 to year t + 5; choice of tax incentives at year t).
Variable Pred. sign PTBIi,t+1 = c0 + c1
PTBIi,t + ei,t+1 (4)
PTBIi,t+1 = a0 + a1PTBIi,t + a2EXEMPTi
+ a1EXEMPTi  PTBIi,t + ei,t+1 (5)
Coeﬃcient t-stat. p-value Coeﬃcient t-stat. p-value
Intercept ? 0.034 9.89 <0.0001 0.029 5.77 <0.0001
PTIi,t + 0.479 20.94 <0.0001 0.635 17.15 <0.0001
EXEMPTi ? 0.010 1.41 0.1595
EXEMPTi  PTIi,t – 0.250 5.34 <0.0001
Adjusted R2 = 0.2674 Adjusted R2 = 0.2833
F-stat. = 438.63 F-stat. = 158.96
(p-value < 0.0001) (p-value < 0.0001)
N = 1200 N = 1200
PTI! Pretax accounting income scaled by average total assets for cross-sectional comparability.
EXEMPT! 1 if the ﬁrm chooses a corporate 5-year tax exemption, and 0 if it chooses shareholder investment tax credits.
EXEMPT  PTI! The interaction term of EXEMPT and PTI.
Table 9
Regression results for Models (4) and (5). (Sample period: year t + 6 to year t + 10; the choice of tax incentives at year t).
Variable Pred. sign PTBIi,t+1 = c0 + c1
PTBIi,t + ei,t+1 (4)
PTBIi,t+1 = a0 + a1PTBIi,t + a2EXEMPTi
+ a1EXEMPTi  PTBIi,t + ei,t+1 (5)
Coeﬃcient t-stat. p-value Coeﬃcient t-stat. p-value
Intercept ? 0.022 6.95 <0.001 0.019 4.02 <0.001
PTIi,t + 0.514 24.64 <0.001 0.538 17.14 <0.001
EXEMPTi ? 0.006 0.87 0.382
EXEMPTi  PTIi,t – 0.044 1.04 0.297
Adjusted R2 = 0.3483 Adjusted R2 = 0.3481
F-stat. = 607.09 F-stat. = 202.82
(p-value < 0.0001) (p-value < 0.0001)
N = 1135 N = 1135
PTI! Pretax accounting income scaled by average total assets for cross-sectional comparability.
EXEMPT! 1 if the ﬁrm chooses a corporate 5-year tax exemption, and 0 if it chooses shareholder investment tax credits.
EXEMPT  PTI! The interaction term of EXEMPT and PTI.
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corporate 5-year tax exemption are more likely to have lower earnings persistence during the ﬁve-year exemp-
tion period than those choosing shareholder investment tax credits.
5. Conclusions and limitations
This study investigates the role of stock market pressure in the trade-oﬀ between corporate and shareholder
tax beneﬁts. The direct examination of ﬁrm managers’ choice of two mutually exclusive alternative tax incen-
tives indicates that privately held ﬁrms are more likely than listed ﬁrms to choose shareholder investment tax
credits and forego corporate tax beneﬁts. Listed ﬁrms with high ERCs are more likely than listed ﬁrms with
low ERCs to choose a corporate 5-year tax exemption, as it can enhance reported after-tax earnings. This
study further examines the consequences of diﬀerent types of tax incentives on ﬁnancial reporting quality.
The results show that in the 5-year period following their choice of tax incentives, ﬁrms choosing a corporate
5-year tax exemption exhibit signiﬁcantly lower earnings persistence than those choosing shareholder invest-
ment tax credits. The results suggest that stock market pressure has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on ﬁrms’ choice of tax
incentive and that the choice of tax incentive aﬀects future earnings quality, as proxied by earnings persistence.
The results of this study extend previous research (Cloyd et al., 1996; Klassen, 1997; Armstrong et al., 2012;
Graham et al., 2014) by providing direct evidence that ﬁrms making eﬀective tax planning decisions consider
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costs). Further, this study provides evidence of the ﬁnancial reporting consequences of two tax incentives.
This demonstrates the complexity of the interaction between ﬁrms’ tax and ﬁnancial decisions (Scholes
et al., 2015). The ﬁndings of this study also have important tax policy implications for countries that use
imputation systems. Under imputation systems, ﬁrms are deemed to have fewer incentives to reduce corporate
tax that is payable at the corporate level, because reducing taxes paid at the corporate level also reduces
imputation credits attributable to shareholders. However, the results of this study suggest that non-tax costs
such as ﬁnancial reporting costs associated with corporate after-tax earnings remain a pronounced factor in
ﬁrms’ choices between corporate and shareholder tax beneﬁts under imputation systems.
There are several limitations and caveats to this study. First, to focus on the eﬀect of capital market incen-
tives on corporate tax planning, the empirical models in this study may omit variables that are potentially cor-
related with ﬁrms’ tax planning decisions, e.g., corporate governance, ownership structure, management
compensation and the capital market eﬃciency hypothesis. To the extent that these omitted variables may
be correlated with stock market pressure, they could confound the results. However, including more variables
in the empirical models eliminates ﬁrms from the sample, which may cause other limitations. Second, the two
types of tax incentives have been criticized for being over-abundant and may cause ﬁrms to over-invest in par-
ticular industries. This study does not address whether the tax incentives cause a loss of eﬃciency or distor-
tions in resources allocation. The focus of this study is ﬁrms’ tax planning behavior at the micro-level, which
may inhibit the generalization of its ﬁndings for broader tax policy implications.
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